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 Previous research on jury trials has focused mainly on the effects of group similarities 
(the similarity-leniency hypothesis; Kerr et al., 1995) and ways to combat those biases to ensure 
fair deliberation. Previous research on the effects of trivial similarities shows increased liking 
and compliance towards individuals who share similarities, but the similarity can also lead to 
participants distancing themselves from the individual if they display negative characteristics 
(i.e., being rude). The current study investigated the effects of shared trivial similarities between 
juror and defendant and possible ways to reduce or possibly eliminate these effects using bias 
correction. The main hypothesis was that trivial similarities between juror and defendant 
influence the juror’s ratings of the defendant, and when asked to correct, jurors will do so. For 
the design of the study, a single-session study was utilized where participants were randomly 
selected to either see a similar or non-similar defendant and provide ratings of guilt, fault, and 
responsibility. The bias correction instructions immediately followed the initial decisions in the 
same sitting and theories of bias were measured as a possible predictor of the shift in ratings 
from pre-to-post-correction instructions. Participants were 150 undergraduate psychology 
students at The Ohio State University who were participating for credit ranging from ages 18 to 
37. The effects of similarity, correction instructions, and the interaction between the two all 
failed to reach significance. Theories of bias also did not significantly interact with condition to 
impact difference in perceptions but were trending in the direction I predicted. Specifically, post-
correction guilt ratings were higher for participants who were in the similar condition which is 
trending in the expected direction. While there were limitations to this study including the 
possibility of the similarities being too subtle, if significant results were found, there would be 




 In the United States, the criminal justice system is meant to be fair and just when 
punishing individuals. One of the main ways this is accomplished is by allowing a jury of peers 
to judge crimes and determine punishment. This right to a jury trial is guaranteed to each citizen 
in the 6th and 7th Amendments of the Bill of Rights (Cong. Rsch. Serv., n.d.). Although it has 
been prominent throughout our country’s history, jury trials and the jury itself has gone through 
many changes to ensure that verdicts are fair. This has included expansion over the years in who 
can serve on a jury, including women, African Americans, and other minorities (each of whom 
had, at certain points in our country’s history had been restricted in their jury service). When 
selecting jurors for a trial, every potential juror must go through jury selection where it is 
determined whether they are going to be fair during the trial. If there is an identified potential for 
bias, jurors can be removed, and another candidate is assessed. Over the years, there have been 
multiple studies looking at ways to improve the trial process even more. This includes studies 
looking at eyewitness testimony and reliability, similarities between jurors and defendant, and 
more. For example, research on eyewitness testimony resulted in the creation of a panel of 
experts called the Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence who published the 
document “Eyewitness Evidence: A guide for law enforcement” in 1999 to improve police 
practices and incorporate de-biasing techniques into the criminal justice system (Technical 
Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, & United States of America, 1999). Why does all this 
matter? The purpose of the current study, along with previous research, is to identify potential 
sources of unfairness that might find their way into the criminal justice system, specifically in 
court. Collectively, researchers seeking to identify such biases presumably want to make sure 
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that jury selection and jury instructions given by the judge do not work against the purpose of 
having a trial -- to have a fair trial.  
Past research has shown that jurors tend to be more lenient in sentencing and award 
amounts when they share similarities with the defendant (Kerr et al., 1995). The examined 
similarities are typically substantial group similarities such as race, ethnicity, religion, or more. 
This is known as the similarity-leniency hypothesis (Kerr et al., 1995). Because research on the 
similarity-leniency hypothesis has primarily examined substantial group similarities, in the 
present research, I decided to take this a step further and examine non-group, more superficial or 
trivial similarities. A trivial similarity is a small similarity such as sharing a birthdate, having the 
same type of fingerprint (loop vs. arch) (Burger et al., 2004), or even dressing similarly, that 
provides little or no relevant information about a person. Such similarities differ from larger 
group similarities that many people can share and connect with such as race or gender. Burger et 
al. (2004) provided research on trivial similarities between participants and a confederate in the 
realm of compliance with a person’s request. They showed that participants who shared a 
birthdate or a first name with the confederate making a request were more likely to comply with 
the request (Burger et al., 2004). Miller et al. (1998) used the prisoner’s dilemma paradigm to 
analyze potential effects of trivial similarities. They found that participants who believed they 
shared a birthday with a partner cooperated more across all types of decisions, including 
situations that were favorable-to-other (i.e., partner receiving more points than participants for 
cooperation). They also found that participants showed no difference in ratings of perceived 
similarity between "birthday-mates" and the control. Thus, both studies showed that trivial 
similarities can influence the participant, even if they do not explicitly perceive a similarity with 
the participant. This is an important point for the current research because in a court context, if 
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trivial similarities have an effect without the juror thinking so, it can lead to biasing in decisions 
and sentencing which is what this study hopes to solve.  
Past research regarding alternative types of trivial similarities investigated the impacts of 
sharing similar names and the effects of this shared similarity. Burger et al. (2004) found in their 
study that when participants believed they shared a first name with someone requesting a 
donation, they ended up donating more money than those who did not share a name. Jones et al. 
(2004) found in marriage records that people are disproportionately likely to marry someone who 
has a similar name (e.g., Eric and Erica). This shows that similar effects occur with similar 
names, not only when the same name is identical. The present research will incorporate the idea 
of using similar names as one of the trivial similarities that the participant will share. Using 
similar rather than identical names should reduce the chance of the participant with an 
uncommon name from noticing the similarity in the study.  
Another area of interest for this study regards the effects of shared trivial similarities and 
liking on juror decisions. Past research has shown that attractive defendants are more likely to 
receive lighter sentences than unattractive defendants for the same crime, presumably because 
jurors like attractive defendants more than unattractive defendants (e.g., Landy & Aronson, 
1969; Nerneth & Sosis, 1973; Smith & Hed, 1979; Stewart, 1985). If people with whom one 
shares a trivial similarity are seen as more likeable or socially attractive and more likeable 
defendants tend to get lighter sentences, might defendants with whom a juror shares a trivial 
similarity also receive a lighter sentence because they are seen as more likeable? This seems 
plausible. One study examined a situation in which the participant rated liking of another (fake) 
participant whose identification number was the same as the birthdate of the real participant. 
They found that participants reported liking their partner more if their ID number was the same 
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as their birthdate (Jones et al., 2004). This shows that sharing trivial similarities increases liking. 
In the context of the current study, this increased liking might lead to the juror being more 
lenient towards the individual they like and with whom they share trivial similarities.   
Although there are many examples of trivial similarities increasing liking and 
cooperation, past research has also found that such similarities can sometimes actually lead to 
harsher reactions and negative behaviors.  Jiang et al. (2010) investigated the effects of trivial 
similarities in a sales context. That is, when a participant shared a trivial similarity with someone 
who was exhibiting an undesirable social behavior, such as being rude to a waitress, the 
participants distanced themselves and felt less connected to the other person. In the Jiang et al. 
study, the undesirable behavior led to a more negative attitude towards a program that was being 
sold by the person exhibiting undesirable behavior and to a lower intention to purchase. Jiang et 
al. (2010) also found that the possibility of an extended relationship with the undesirable person 
moderated the negative effects of the shared trivial similarity. When the participant expected 
future interactions with the person displaying undesirable behavior with whom they share a 
trivial similarity, they distanced themselves, but when they did not expect any further 
interactions, they did not distance themselves. This research is relevant to the current study 
because if participants view the defendant as someone who has engaged in undesirable social 
behavior (i.e., being in the wrong, or at least engaging in some form of anti-social behavior), 
then the participant might try to distance themselves and not be lenient in sentencing. Because 
participants do not expect additional interactions with the defendant, however, perhaps no such 




 The goal of this study is to determine whether trivial similarities, such as sharing a 
birthdate, between juror and defendant will affect the verdict and whether jurors will correct for 
this bias when they are made aware of it.  With all the past research in mind about the effects of 
trivial similarities, my main hypothesis about trivial similarities for the present research is that 
jurors who share trivial similarities with a defendant will report them as less guilty and will make 
awards (in the civil case) that are more favorable to the similar defendant.  
While there is a significant amount of work examining the biasing effects of trivial 
similarities, less work has focused on trivial similarities in jury decisions, and how individuals 
might correct for such biases. To address this, I wanted to examine whether, when made aware 
of the possibility of a bias, participants will correct for this.  Bias can be an unduly favorable or 
unfavorable reaction toward a person, place, thing, or idea. Beyond similarity or liking towards 
someone in a trial, there are many features of the defendant that can induce jury bias, including 
bias towards a defendant’s race (e.g., Johnson et al., 1995). To try to eliminate this bias, in trials, 
before the jury is released to deliberation or to discuss the case to reach a verdict, the judge reads 
instructions to the jury about the law relevant to the case and about their deliberations. These 
instructions typically include information about the laws relevant to the case, information that is 
not to be used in the decision, and other various instructions. Past research has shown that these 
instructions are, in short, not helpful and often fail to reduce bias (e.g., Ellsworth & Mauro, 
1998; Lieberman & Sales, 1997). It is unclear whether the problem lies with the specific 
instructions that are typically used or with people’s motivation or ability to engage in corrections 
aimed at avoiding bias (Wegener et al., 2000). 
With the potential implications for jury trials in the background, it might be helpful to 
consider past research on bias correction outside the courtroom context. For example, McCaslin 
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et al. (2010) used a paradigm in which they informed participants that they were 
“overestimators” or “underestimators” and examined how that labeling changed their later 
estimates in a dot estimation task. They found that when people were asked to correct for their 
perceived estimation bias, they corrected in the direction opposite of the label they had been 
given (i.e., down if they were overestimators and up if they were underestimators). Because 
participants had been randomly assigned to be labeled as over- or underestimators, the 
corrections actually made them less accurate in their later dot estimates. In the second 
experiment, they found that participants became less willing to correct for their supposed bias 
when they believed there were benefits for the self in having that bias (e.g., if over-estimators are 
better problem solvers, then there was not as much reason in their minds to correct for an over-
estimation bias). Within a jury context, if jurors are aware of the possible bias (based on the 
trivial similarities) they might over- or under-correct when asked to re-report their verdict. Also, 
in a jury setting, there is a possibility that they might think there are benefits to keeping their 
inaccuracies (e.g., “doing justice” or “putting away the bad guy”). Jury trials are supposed to be 
fair trials and finding a way to make sure people correct for biases and make a fair judgment is 
one of the key questions that was addressed in this study.  
Though not exactly the same as similarity-based liking, some bias correction research 
investigated corrections of the impacts of source likability in persuasion. One study found that 
when no correction was given, attitudes toward a proposal were more favorable when the 
message was presented by a likable rather than dislikable source. But when given a correction 
instruction, attitudes were more favorable when the message was given by a dislikable rather 
than likable source (Petty et al., 1998). In a jury context, if a juror finds a defendant to be more 
likable, possibly due to trivial similarities, they might be more favorable towards them (i.e., less 
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likely to find them guilty or, if guilty, more lenient in terms of punishment). In the present 
research, this could mean that if trivial similarities make the defendant seem more likable, the 
juror might award them more money in a civil judgment. Also, if alerted to the possibility of 
bias, participants might change their answers, and award more money to a less likable person 
(sharing no similarities with the participant). Specifically, when made aware of the bias and its 
possible effects on their initial judgments, participants may attempt to correct for their initial bias 
and award more money to the other person. 
Hypothesis 
Taking all the information about similarity-leniency hypothesis, trivial similarities, and 
bias correction into consideration, my overall hypothesis is that trivial similarities between juror 
and defendant will influence the juror to be more lenient/award more to the similar defendant 
than non-similar defendant. When asked to correct for possible bias, however, jurors will correct 
for their similarity-induced biases, resulting in a reduced bias. With bias correction, there is a 
possibility of overcorrection which would occur when the participant is made aware of the 
possible biasing effects and asked to correct for them. Participants might award the non-similar 
defendant more money/be more lenient as a way to correct the previous bias.  
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 150 undergraduate psychology students ranging from ages 18 to 37 (M 
= 19.16 SD = 2.22) who completed the study for class credit. There were 63 (42%) male 




 This study used a mixed design where each participant completed both initial and 
corrected ratings in addition to a between-subject similarity factor. To manipulate similarity, 
participants were randomly selected to see either a similar defendant or a non-similar defendant 
(control). After their decisions regarding fault, responsibility, and guilt for the defendant and 
plaintiff, I asked questions about theories of bias to see if they might predict ratings or shifts in 
ratings. 
 After informed consent, participants completed background information for a study 
regarding jury selection. The general background information about the participant was used to 
create shared trivial similarities through the use of piping the text into the defendant description. 
The similarity information included birthdate, not including the year, the participant’s specific 
hometown and the closest major city to their hometown, and the participant’s initials. 
Participants were then told that they had been selected for the jury and would receive 
information about a civil case. Participants received a police-like report of a description of both 
defendant and plaintiff adapted from Gleason and Harris (1975). The defendant varied in terms 
of whether they were similar or not to the participant; the plaintiff did not share any similarities 
or have specific dissimilarities from the participant.  
Materials 
 Participants saw a fake police summary for the background of the defendant that included 
name, age, birthdate, height, weight, hair color and hometown (Figure A1). This summary was 
adapted from Gleason and Harris (1975) and can be found in Appendix A. The name, hometown, 
and birthdate (not including year) autofilled from the participant answers for background 
information if selected for the similar condition. Then, the participants saw a fake police 
description of the plaintiff. In this description, they saw “Name: K.P.”, “Age 28 years”, “Birth 
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Date: April 26th, 1992”, “Height: 6 feet”, “Weight: 183 lbs.”, “Hair Color: Brown”, and 
“Hometown: Omaha, Nebraska”. None of the information included in the description of the 
plaintiff changed across participants, only the defendant information changed across participants 
within the similar condition. 
Participants then received a brief case summary of a minor fender bender that was also 
adapted from Gleason and Harris (1975). For the full summary, see Figure A2 in Appendix A. 
The case described when the accident occurred, where it occurred, and a detailed description of 
the scene. It included statements from both the defendant and plaintiff about the accident, a 
statement about police estimation of damage, and an eyewitness report. The case was somewhat 
ambiguous regarding who was at fault to enable potential similarity-based biases to influence 
their uncorrected judgments. After the descriptions, there was a reading check to make sure that 
participants paid attention to the information. These were multiple choice questions asking where 
the plaintiff’s hometown was and when the accident occurred. 
Finally, the participants were given instructions based on the information given. They 
were asked to report guilt, responsibility, and fault of both the plaintiff and defendant using a 5-
point scale ranging from “Not <guilty/at fault/responsible at all>” to “Very <guilty/much at 
fault/responsible>”. Then, they were told that both the plaintiff and defendant are willing to 
settle, and the participant was to divide $10,000 between them for damages. This measure was 
set up using a toggle bar to distribute money to both plaintiff and defendant where the total had 
to add up to $10,000. After the initial decisions, regardless of condition, the participants were 
told that while they were completing the questions, a possible bias was noticed between them 
and the defendant and the researchers would like for them to re-do their answers taking into 
account that potential bias. Participants were then asked to re-report their answers of guilt, 
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responsibility, and fault, and asked again to re-distribute money to both plaintiff and defendant 
using the same measures as they used at time 1. Participants were then thanked for their 
participation and debriefed about the purpose of the study.  
Results  
Manipulation Check 
 A manipulation check was done to investigate whether the manipulation of similarity 
condition affected liking of the defendant. Results indicated that the manipulation of similarity 
condition did significantly affect how much the defendant was liked t(148) = 2.426, p = 0.016. 
The similar defendant was liked more (M = 3.087, SD = 0.487) than the non-similar defendant 
(M = 2.880, SD = 0.555).  
Guilt 
To analyze the impact of Similarity condition (similar vs. non-similar) on guilt prior to 
correction instructions, I conducted an independent samples t-test on ratings of defendant guilt. 
The effect of Similarity on uncorrected guilt was not significant, t(148) = 0.404, p = 0.687. Even 
if similarity did not influence uncorrected defendant guilt, correction instructions could prompt 
shifts in judgments. To examine this possibility, I conducted a mixed-design general linear 
model analysis that included the Similarity condition, the Time at which ratings were made (pre- 
vs post-correction) and the interaction of those two factors. Results showed no significant main 
effect of defendant Similarity, F(1, 148) = 0.495, p = 0.483. There was also no significant main 
effect for the Time at which guilt ratings were taken (pre- vs post-correction-instruction), F(1, 
148) = .053, p = 0.818. Finally, the 2-way interaction was also not significant (F[1,148]= 0.214, 
p=0.645). Please see Table B1 in Appendix B for means and standard deviations of guilt ratings 
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as a function of Time and Similarity and Table B2 for means and standard deviations of the 
difference in guilt ratings as a function of Similarity. 
Perhaps there were not overall shifts in ratings from pre- to post-correction-instructions 
because participants simply did not view similarity as likely to affect initial perceptions. To 
examine this possibility, a single-sample t-test was used to analyze participant’s perceptions of 
being affected by similarity where answers were compared against the midpoint value which was 
a neutral response. Results were significant t(149) = 15.354, p < 0.0001 and show that 
participants did believe that similarity with a defendant would be associated with leniency (M = 
6.674, SD = 1.335). Considering that results indicate participants believed similarity would 
influence their opinion, the lack of significant results might be due to the manipulations being 
too subtle or too noticeable, which is discussed further later. Although participants believe that 
their perceptions would be affected by similarity, I investigated whether theories of bias might 
predict ratings. I examined the overall reported theories of bias and used them to predict shifts 
from pre- to post-correction-instruction ratings (post-correction ratings minus pre-correction 
ratings). The theories of bias measures were used to address how participants thought similarity 
might influence guilt, fault, and responsibility ratings, regardless of the condition they were in. 
For example, one theories of bias question asked, “Do you think that sharing a name or birthdate 
with someone would affect your opinions of that individual?” where they rated their answer on a 
9-point scale ranging from “Opinions would be less favorable towards the individual I like” to 
“Opinions would be more favorable towards the individual I like”. A regression analysis was 
then completed to investigate how theories of bias might moderate the impact of condition on 
difference in guilt perceptions of the defendant. The key interaction between theories of bias and 
similarity condition was not significant, F(1, 149) = 1.14, p = 0.336, and can be seen in Figure 1 
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below. In follow-up analyses to investigate the simple effects of theories of bias within each 
similarity condition, theories of bias did not significantly predict guilt difference for those in the 
similar condition, B=0.067, t(74) = 1.094, p = 0.278, or for those in the non-similar condition, 
B=-0.088, t(74) = -1.432, p = 0.156. Though none of these results were significant, when 
theories of bias were high, those in the similar condition reported directionally higher guilt 
ratings than those in the non-similar condition, but when theories of bias were low, those in the 
similar condition reported lower guilt ratings. Put differently, for those in the similar condition, 
post-correction guilt ratings were higher than pre-correction ratings when theories of bias were 
high versus when theories of bias were low. For those in the non-similar condition, the opposite 
occurred; post-correction guilt ratings were lower than pre-correction ratings when theories of 
bias were high versus when theories of bias were low. This pattern was directionally consistent 
with my hypothesis, albeit not significantly so. 
Figure 1 





 To analyze the impact of Similarity condition (similar vs. non-similar) on responsibility 
prior to correction instructions, I conducted an independent samples t-test on ratings of defendant 
responsibility. The effect of Similarity on uncorrected responsibility was not significant, t(147) = 
1.018, p = 0.310. Even if similarity did not influence uncorrected defendant responsibility, 
correction instructions could prompt shifts in judgments. To examine this possibility, I conducted 
a mixed-design general linear model analysis that included the Similarity condition, the Time at 
which ratings were made (pre- vs post-correction) and the interaction of those two factors. 
Results showed no significant main effect of defendant Similarity, F(1,147) = 1.388, p = 0.241. 
There was also no significant main effect for the Time at which responsibility ratings were taken 
(pre- vs post-correction-instruction), F(1,147) = 0.007, p = 0.933. Finally, the 2-way interaction 






























means and standard deviations of responsibility ratings as a function of Time and Similarity and 
Table B2 for means and standard deviations of the difference in responsibility ratings as a 
function of Similarity. 
Again, I examined the overall reported theories of bias and used them to predict shifts 
from pre- to post-correction-instruction ratings to possibly explain why there were no overall 
shifts in ratings from pre- to post-correction instructions. A regression analysis was then 
conducted to investigate how theories of bias might moderate the impact of similarity condition 
on the difference in responsibility perceptions of the defendant. Results for the theories of bias 
by similarity interaction were not significant, F(1,148) = 0.576, p = 0.632, and can be seen below 
in Figure 2. In follow-up analyses to investigate the simple effects of theories of bias within each 
similarity condition, theories of bias did not significantly predict responsibility shifts for those in 
the similar condition, B = 0.030, t(73) = 0.400, p = 0.691, or for those in the non-similar 
condition, B = -0.110, t (74) = -1.174, p = 0.244. For those in the similar condition, post-
correction responsibility ratings are higher than pre-correction ratings when theories of bias are 
high versus when theories of bias are low. For those in the non-similar condition, post-correction 
responsibility ratings are lower than pre-correction ratings when theories of bias are high versus 
when theories of bias are low. This is similar to what was seen in Figure 1 for guilt ratings but 
was again quite weak. 
Figure 2  





To analyze the impact of Similarity condition (similar vs. non-similar) on fault prior to 
correction instructions, I conducted an independent samples t-test on ratings of defendant fault. 
The effect of Similarity on uncorrected fault was not significant. t(147) = 0.331, p = 0.741. Even 
if similarity did not influence uncorrected defendant fault, correction instructions could prompt 
shifts in judgments. To examine this possibility, I conducted a mixed-design general linear 
model analysis that included the Similarity condition, the Time at which ratings were made (pre- 
vs. post-correction) and the interaction of those two factors. Results showed no significant main 
effect of defendant Similarity, F(1,147) = 0.621, p = 0.432. There was also no significant main 
effect for the Time at which fault ratings were taken (pre- vs post-correction-instruction), 
F(1,147) = 0.896, p = 0.345., Finally, the 2-way interaction was also not significant, F(1,147) = 





































ratings as a function of Time and Similarity and Table B2 for means and standard deviations of 
the difference in fault ratings as a function of Similarity. 
Again, I examined the overall reported theories of bias and used them to predict shifts 
from pre- to post-correction-instruction ratings to possibly explain why there were no overall 
shifts in ratings from pre- to post-correction instructions. A regression analysis was then 
conducted to investigate how theories of bias might moderate the impact of similarity condition 
on fault perceptions of the defendant. Results of the interaction of theory and similarity were not 
significant, F(1,148) = 0.663, p = 0.576 and can be seen below in Figure 3. In follow-up analyses 
to investigate the simple effects of theories of bias within each similarity condition, theories of 
bias did not significantly predict fault difference for those in the similar condition, B = -0.052, 
t(73) = -0.806, p = 0.423, or for those in the non-similar condition, B = 0.064, t(74) = 0.889, p = 
0.377. The fault ratings showed the opposite pattern of what was seen for the guilt ratings. For 
those in the similar condition, post-correction fault ratings were higher than pre-correction 
ratings when theories of bias were low versus when theories of bias were high. For those in the 
non-similar condition, post-correction fault ratings were lower than pre-correction ratings when 
theories of bias were low versus when theories of bias were high.  
Figure 3 





To analyze the impact of Similarity condition (similar vs. non-similar) on money 
awarded prior to correction instructions, I conducted an independent samples t-test on the 
amount of money awarded to the defendant. The effect of Similarity on uncorrected money 
awarded was not significant. t(149) = -0.293, p = 0.699. Even if similarity did not influence 
uncorrected defendant money awarded, correction instructions could prompt shifts in judgments. 
To examine this possibility, I conducted a mixed-design general linear model analysis that 
included the Similarity condition, the Time at which ratings were made (pre- vs. post-correction) 
and the interaction of those two factors. Results showed no significant main effect of defendant 
Similarity, F(1,149) = 0.273, p = 0.602. There was also no significant main effect for the Time at 
which amount of money awarded ratings were taken (pre- vs post-correction-instruction), 






























0.086, p = 0.770. Please see Table B1 in Appendix B for means and standard deviations of 
money awarded as a function of Time and Similarity and Table B2 for means and standard 
deviations of the difference in money awarded as a function of Similarity. 
Again, I examined the overall reported theories of bias and used them to predict shifts 
from pre- to post-correction-instruction ratings to possibly explain why there were no overall 
shifts in ratings from pre- to post-correction instructions. A regression analysis was then 
conducted to investigate how theories of bias might moderate the impact of similarity condition 
on money awarded to the defendant. Results of the interaction of theory and similarity were not 
significant, F(1,149) = 0.442, p = 0.724 and can be seen below in Figure 4. In follow-up analyses 
to investigate the simple effects of theories of bias within each similarity condition, theories of 
bias did not significantly predict the difference in money awarded for those in the similar 
condition, B = 159.013, t(74) = 1.077, p = 0.285, or for those in the non-similar condition, B = 
31.741, t(74) = 0.199, p = 0.843. For those in the similar condition, post-correction money 
awarded ratings were lower than pre-correction ratings when theories of bias were low versus 
when theories of bias were high. For those in the non-similar condition, post-correction money 
awarded ratings were also lower than pre-correction ratings when theories of bias were low 
versus when theories of bias were high.  
Figure 4 




General Discussion  
Although this study produced no overall significant effects, results were trending in the 
direction that was predicted for two of the three dependent variables. My hypothesis was that 
trivial similarities between juror and defendant matter and will influence the juror to be more 
lenient/award more to the similar defendant than non-similar plaintiff and when asked to correct 
for possible bias, jurors should correct, resulting in a reduced bias. Results indicated that those 
who were in the similar condition tended only slightly to report higher guilt and responsibility 
ratings post-correction. That direction was consistent with my hypothesis that when given 
correction instructions, participants will correct more when they share trivial similarities with the 
defendant. These results were not replicated for fault ratings, but I will discuss possible reasons 








































significant in affecting a change in liking of the defendant, but not in ratings of guilt, fault, 
responsibility, and money awarded. This could mean that maybe participants noticed enough of 
the similarity manipulation to like the similar defendant more, but it was not enough to affect 
their ratings of the defendant possibly because the manipulation was not effective enough. Other 
possibilities of why this occurred will be discussed later in this section. 
Beyond the main effects of similarity for guilt and responsibility, I also found that the 
higher the theories of bias, the larger the difference between guilt ratings based on condition. 
Specifically, there was a larger difference between guilt ratings when theories of bias were high 
compared to when theories of bias were low. This was also seen for responsibility ratings as 
well, but the difference between responsibility ratings when theories of bias were high is not as 
large as the difference in guilt ratings when theories of bias were high. For fault ratings, the 
opposite pattern was seen. When theories of bias were low, the difference in fault ratings was 
much larger than when theories of bias were high. It is unknown why this occurred only for fault 
ratings but it is an interesting aspect of the study results. This could possibly be due to the fact 
that, because the case was ambiguous, participants might not have felt comfortable assigning 
fault, or they may be set on who was a fault and not want to change their answer. 
If significant results had been found, this would have had implications for courts in both 
the judge’s instruction and the jury selection process. The instructions that judges give to jurors 
before they go into deliberation are in need of improvement overall, but if results were 
significant, issues regarding the effects of similarities with plaintiffs or witnesses for both the 
prosecution and defense would need to be examined and addressed to take steps toward 
improvement suggestions to judge instructions. Also, if significant results were found, there 
would be implications for jury selection and voir dire (process of selecting jurors for a trial). If 
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significant, it could mean that lawyers might be able to select or exclude people for a jury based 
on trivial similarities they may share with either the defendant or plaintiff, and these similarities 
could be a factor in the overall voir dire process. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Noticeable Similarity 
 In this study, my goal was to make the shared similarities subtle enough to possibly 
create a bias between the participant and defendant. In doing this, I may have pushed the 
boundary a bit too far to be subtle, which may have led participants to notice the similarities and 
adapting their ratings to this information. In the study, to introduce the subtle similarities in the 
police description of the defendant, the information that each participant put in for their 
background questions was auto-filled into the initials, hometown, and birthdate for the 
defendant. If the participant misspelled anything or formatted their answer oddly, it would 
autofill verbatim, which might have led to them noticing the similarities and reacting differently. 
For example, if they mis-typed or had odd formatting, they might have been more likely to notice 
the manipulation and change their answers to what they think the research might have expected 
(or tried not to be affected by the similarity because it seemed forced on them). Since 
participants did believe that similarity would have an impact on their ratings, by noticing the 
results they might have perceived the defendant as not truly being similar to them, but as being 
“faked” because of the piped information and odd formatting. Future studies could adapt to this 
limitation by possibly giving a pre-test at an earlier date to collect background information, and 
then create unique studies for each participant that are given at a later date, using the information 
they provided previously with properly formatted information for the defendant to eliminate 




Another significant limitation is that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, participants were 
not being brought into the lab and were taking the study elsewhere (i.e., at home) which didn’t 
allow us as researchers to control the environment where the participant would take the study. 
This may have affected the results that were obtained because the environment they took the 
study in could not be controlled and could lead to distractions that kept them from paying enough 
attention to the study and therefore might have missed similarity manipulations. Bringing 
participants into the lab allows for the testing environment to be controlled and distraction free, 
whereas taking the study at home, there are multiple distraction possibilities that could lead the 
participant to not pay attention to the study details and miss important information in the study. 
Being able to control the testing environment eliminates these distractions and possible future 
replications post-pandemic could examine whether this was a significant determinant of the 
results obtained.  
Another reason why this study may have lacked significant results was that the 
manipulations might have been too weak given the available sample size. Although I was trying 
to make the similarities subtle, there is a possibility that they were too subtle, and participants did 
not notice enough relevant information to create bias. Since results indicated that participants 
viewed similarity as having an impact on their perceptions, having under-powered manipulations 
might not have created enough similarity to have a significant biasing effect. Future studies 
could examine the possibility of adding more trivial similarities to the study to strengthen the 
manipulation or find other methods to increase power to investigate whether a higher-powered 
version of the study might yield significant results.  
Negative Similarity Effects 
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If my measures were too subtle or too obvious, future studies could investigate whether 
there are conditions under which trivial similarities no longer have an effect on juror opinions or 
if they even might sometimes have a negative effect. In Jiang et al. (2010), they found that when 
participants share trivial similarities with someone displaying negative characteristics, they try to 
distance themselves and see the person as less likeable. It would be interesting to see if this could 
happen in a courtroom context and if the similarities can be subtle enough to create bias, but not 
too obvious to lead to unintended effects. For example, if jurors share trivial similarities with a 
defendant who either is displaying negative characteristics, either in the courtroom during the 
trial (e.g., screaming at judge, swearing at lawyer/judge), or in the crime they committed (e.g., 
violent crime instead of civil crime) would this lead the juror to try to distance themselves, and at 
what point would that happen?  
Future Study Changes 
Because there were no significant results in the current study, there are quite a few next 
steps that could be taken to revise the study to possibly find more informative results. Due to 
time constraints after the IRB protocol was approved, I was unable to run pre-tests for the 
measures and was unable to edit the study and test participants again. One of the first things I 
would edit would be the measures for guilt, fault, and responsibility. All of these measures 
address whether the participant is more lenient towards the defendant, but I think that in the 
future, an expanded set of guilt, fault, and responsibility measures should be included so that a 
more detailed analysis can be made to see if a possible bias occurred. Another item I would 
change is the way that the study was distributed. Initially, I attempted to run a 2-part study where 
initial judgments were followed up at a later date from the original judgments, but retention was 
a major limitation that led to the use of a full single-session study instead. Using this two-part 
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format for the study would better simulate a typical court proceeding where the correction 
instructions come at a later time than the initial information. 
Conclusion 
 This study investigated the potential effects of trivial similarities shared between juror 
and defendant and whether these biases could be corrected after encountering bias correction 
instructions. Overall, results were not significant but patterns on two of the outcome measures 
were trending in the direction of my hypothesis. Although this study did not find significant 
results, the results that were found pave the path for future steps and studies that investigate the 
impact of trivial similarities in a courtroom context and have implications for judge instructions 
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Police Summary of Defendant 
SUMMARY OF POLICE FILES ON BACKGROUND OF THE DEFENDANT 
NAME: T.T. – will change to same initials as the participant which was listed in background 
questionnaire. 
AGE: 26 years 
BIRTH DATE: March 3, 1994 – will change to same birthdate participant listed in background 
questionnaire, but not birth year. 
HEIGHT: 6 feet, 2 inches 
WEIGHT: 170 lb. 
HAIR COLOR: Brown 
HOMETOWN: Cleveland, Ohio – will change to major city participant has listed in background 
questionnaire. 
Figure A2 
Police Summary of Plaintiff 




AGE: 28 years 
BIRTH DATE: April 26, 1992 
HEIGHT: 6 feet 
WEIGHT: 183 lb. 
HAIR COLOR: Brown 
HOMETOWN: Omaha, Nebraska 
Figure A3 
Case Summary 
SUMMARY OF CASE: 
 The defendant and plaintiff were involved in a motor vehicle accident on Tuesday, April 
18th, around 4:45pm. The accident occurred on the corner of Broad St. and Elm St. at an 
intersection. The defendant was driving northbound on Elm while the plaintiff was turning 
right from Broad to Elm, when the two cars made contact. The plaintiff states s/he looked 
both ways multiple times before making the turn. The defendant states that s/he did not see a 
car at the intersection and proceeded through. Police estimate that the damage to the 
defendant/plaintiff’s car was significantly worse than the damage to the other. An eyewitness 
reported that they “…didn’t see the whole thing, but it looks like the (defendant/plaintiff) 






Tables of Means and Standard Deviations 
Table B1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Ratings Towards Defendant as a Function of Both Time and 
Condition 
 Pre-correction Post-correction 
Condition M SD M SD 
  Guilt 
Similar 3.6 0.788 3.64 0.69 
Non-similar 3.55 0.827 3.53 0.811 
  Fault 
Similar 3.54 0.863 3.65 0.814 
Non-similar 3.49 0.876 3.51 0.76 
  Responsibility 
Similar 3.54 0.814 3.53 0.759 
Non-similar 3.4 0.87 3.41 0.931 
  Money 
Similar 4819.59 2026.96 4727.91 2153.25 
Non-Similar 4936.15 2116.2 4925.51 1946.09 
 
Table B2  
Means and Standard Deviations for Difference in Ratings of Defendant as a Function of 
Condition 
 Shift/Difference (post - pre) 
Condition M SD 
  Guilt 
Similar 0.04 0.725 
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Non-Similar -0.013 0.688 
  Fault 
Similar 0.108 0.769 
Non-Similar 0.013 0.797 
  Responsibility 
Similar 0 0.891 
Non-Similar 0.013 1.046 
  Money 
Similar -94.68 1753.56 
Non-Similar -10.63 1772.89 
 
 
